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Abstract
This study aims at examining how local communities in City of Cilegon (Banten
province in Indonesia) consider ‘complex disasters’, and clarifying their subjective
perceptions. The present research is considered as the first step in our comprehensive
research design beyond a specific case study. The nuclear accidents in the Great
East Japan Earthquake and the huge flood in Thailand provide lessons that natural
disasters can cause catastrophic influences on industries and they generate cascading
effects and damages. We define such complicated phenomena as ‘complex disasters’
in this article. Cilegon is potentially exposed to such complex disasters because it
has natural disaster risks (among others, the Krakatau volcano sits adjacent to it, and
recalling historical earthquakes and tsunami) and industrial disaster risks (a lot of
heavy industry facilities including chemical ones), and these two types of risks can
be combined and made reality. A ‘model for the communication of risk’ developed by
Rodriguez et al. (2007) is adopted as an analytical framework in this study. The model
predicts involvement of many types of actors and can be considered as an adequate
framework for our study. This study mainly focused on one industrial gas facility of
Pertamina, a state-owned energy company, and its surrounding community (Lebak
Gede village) in Cilegon. The qualitative methodologies were used in this study: One
focused group discussion (FGD) and three key informant interviewswere implemented
by the authors. The participants of the FGD were twelve leaders of the neighborhood
associations (locally described as ‘RT’ and ‘RW’ in Indonesian acronym) closest to the
Pertamina facility (two RW leaders and ten RT leaders). The key informant interviews
were separately and additionally conducted with a head of a village, a neighborhood
association leader (this leader was different from the FGD participants) and a local
forum entity, in order to reinforce observations at the FGD. Our survey observed that
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involvement of the Indonesia Power, a subsidiary of state-owned electricity company
whose facilities adjacent to Petamina’s facility, as one of the industry actors, local
governmental agencies and the Indonesian Red Cross. On the other hand, we did not
clearly identify any clear involvement of the educational institutions and the mass
media, although the model of Rodriguez et al. (2007) estimates their engagement.
People in Lebak Gede village have already expected potential threats by large-scale
natural disasters. Furthermore, they recognize that such disasters give influence on the
industrial facilities and the consequences are catastrophic. Although local residents in
Lebak Gede village had a lot of experiences of industrial accidents in the past, these
experiences did not initiate a significant mindset change for a more organized pre-
paredness. Instead, they paid larger attentions to floods as their preparedness priority.
This study adopted the qualitative method for gathering specific information, but
more comprehensive research can contribute to verify preparedness and risk percep-
tion on the complex disasters. Although this article selectively dealt with one village
(Lebak Gede village) and its preparedness and perception, the findings is to be further
clarified in detail for generalizing community preparedness for the complex disasters.
Keywords: community, risk perception, natural disaster risk, industrial disaster risk,
complex disaster, Cilegon
1. Introduction
1.1. Background of this study: Why focusing on ‘complex disaster’?
As we learned from the nuclear accidents in the Great East Japan Earthquake and the
huge flood in Thailand in 2011, natural disasters give influences on industries and they
cause snow-balling effects and damages. In that sense, the supply chain management
is one of the most typical issue. The authors recognize these phenomenon as ‘complex
disasters’, and consider that it should be examined based on research findings both of
natural disaster research and occupational health and safety research. Some previous
works, such as Linden and Perry [1], Sengul et al. [2] and Youngman [3], have already
explored the complex disaster. However, the relevant research has been still limited,
and further efforts are required to contribute to the society.
City of Cilegon (Province Banten in Indonesia) is potentially exposed to such complex
disasters, because it faces with natural disaster risks (the Krakatau eruption in 1883,
historical earthquakes and tsunami) and industrial disaster risks (a lot of heavy industry
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facilities and accidents). Cilegon is a one of the most famous and significant heavy
industrial zones (Adiningsih et al. [4]; Hudalah et al. [5]; Cahyandito [6]). Historically,
the first development of the Cilegon industrial zone was organized in the steel indus-
try, and then the chemical industries have been added gradually (Moon [7]). Sucilo
et al. [8] wrote that Cilegon is exposed to the Krakatau volcano eruption risk and
other earthquakes. Furthermore, the BNPB (national disaster management agency
in Indonesia) introduced tsunami risk in addition with the Krakatau volcanic eruption
and other seismic risk (BNPB [9]). BNPB [9] clearly noted that “If there is a major
earthquake in the Megathrust segment of the Sunda Strait, the most threatened area
of the tsunami is the industrial area in Cilegon City.” The Health Crisis Center of the
IndonesianMinistry of Health has already conducted themapping of chemical disaster-
prone areas in Cilegon, although the results are not publicly available.
1.2. Literature review: A model for the communication of
risk and risk perception
As an analytical framework in this study, we apply a ‘model for the communication
of risk’, developed by Rodriguez et al. [10]. The ‘model for the communication of risk’
was constructed based on Nigg [11]. This model was constructed for exploring ‘natural’
disasters, but it can be considered to be applicable for other types of disasters including
technological events (Donner and Rodriguez [12] and O’Hair et al. [13]). As shown
in Figure 1, it illustrates interaction between many actors. The model demonstrates
‘general population’ as its basis, and it emphasizes the importance that risk infor-
mation should be disseminated and understood by people. Additionally, ‘emergency
management agencies’, ‘mass media’ and ‘industry’ are included in the model. Taking
considering with the geographical uniqueness in Cilegon as the industrial city, the
model can be considered as an adequate framework for our study.
Regarding risk perception, Gaillard [14] overviewed the earlier works. According to
Gaillard [14], the previous research can be categorized into some groups. Among them,
the authors of this study rely on a basic concept emphasizing the importance of ‘social
contexts’ (Torry [15]; Susman et al. [16]; Hewitt [17]). This concept states that “the
perception of a natural hazard and behavior that may affect the threat it poses, is more
related to societal organization and values than perceptions of geophysical conditions
and that disasters are not explained by behavior peculiar to the disaster event but
rather by the nature of society in a particular geographic location (Gaillard [14]).”
Furthermore, Gaillard [14] indicated that “there might not be a causal relationship
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Figure 1: Model for the communication of risk (reprinting from Rodriguez et al. [10]).
between risk perception and behavior; rather behavior would be constrained by social
structure. Therefore, in order to understand risk perception, it would be necessary to
understand the wider social context in which individuals are situated.” This way of
thinking is fully consistent with the model of Rodriguez et al. [10]. The model relates
people with a variety of social actors, and it can be considered that the model has an
implicit assumption that risk information is communicated through interaction among
the actors.
This study examines how local communities in Cilegon currently prepare for ‘com-
plex disasters’. This article specifically clarifies their subjective understanding and per-
ceptions. The present research is considered as the first step in our comprehensive
research design beyond a simple case study.
2. Methods
As a case study, we mainly focused on one industrial gas facility of Pertamina, a
state-owned energy company, and its surrounding community (Lebak Gede village) in
Cilegon. Other industrial companies were not excluded but also included as necessary.
The qualitative methodologies were adopted in this study for obtaining primary
information on risk perception of the local people: One focused group discussion (FGD)
and three key informant interviewswere conducted between 9th August 2017 and 12th
August 2017.
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The participants of the FGD were twelve leaders of the neighborhood associations
(known as ‘RT (Rukun Tetangga)’ and ‘RW (Rukun Warga)’ in Indonesia) in closest to
the Pertamina facility. Three RW are adjacent to the Pertamina facility and there are
seventeen RT under these three RW. Two leaders of these three RW and ten RT leaders
attended the FGD. Origins of the FGD participants did not concentrate on specific RW,
but they were proportionally distributed. Also, the FGD participants were comprised of
male and female leaders.
The interviewees of the three key informant interviewswere a head of a village (the
Indonesian name of the administration level is ‘kelurahan’), a neighborhood associa-
tion leader (hereinafter referred to as ‘a head of a RW’) and a local forum entity, in
order to compare with and complement the results of the FGD. A head of a RW was
different from the FGD participants, but the head’s RW locates in Lebak Gede village.
The local forum entity targets disaster risk reduction in Lebak Gede village, composed
of volunteer villagers, and is independent from other institutions.
3. Results
3.1. Risk perception on the complex disaster
3.1.1. Complex disaster
In the FGD, a discussion wasmade on complex disaster risk which can be caused by the
Krakatau. The Krakatau volcano, locating within 60 km in the west from Cilegon, made
an explosive eruption in 1883. The ejected materials from the volcano went down in
the ocean, and they generated a huge tsunami (Nomanbhoy and Satake [18]; Maeno
and Imamura [19]). Summarized by Maeno and Imamura [19], the runup height of the
tsunami reached over 30 m, and the coastal areas of Cilegon were inundated. The FGD
participants argued: A Krakatau eruption similar with the 1883 eruption will damage
tanks of factories, and gas leakage can be happened, and it cannot be safer if people
evacuate to the top of mountain (In the topographical characteristics, the Lebak Gede
village faces with the Sunda Strait, and it has mountains behind the village). Also, they
discussed that their village is surrounded by chemical factories and toxic gas are filled
even though the villager can survive from tsunami waves. Apart from the Krakatau,
the FGD participants did not clearly talk about tsunami which can be generated by
earthquake under the ocean. Besides that, the FGD participants said they felt worried
and afraid if Krakatau Mountain will erupt.
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Original discourse: Kalau saya mah membayangkan kalau Krakatau,
walaupun kita evakuasi ke atas gunung, meleduk, pasti retak sih tangki yang
ada di sekitar kita dari ujung sana, ya tetep, yang namanya pecah, gas, larinya
ke gunung bahaya kan. Walaupun kita selamat dari tsunami, tapi gasnya itu
kan yang ke mana-mana. Kalau sebelum ada tangki kita mungkin selamat naik
gunung, sebelum ada pabrik-pabrik kimia. Tapi setelah ada pabrik kimia.
(Translation: If I imagine that Krakatau Mountain will be erupted, even though
we are evacuating to the top of the mountain, the industries facilities and
tanks around us are cracking, and the effect will reach the mountain. That’s
still dangerous for us. Even though we will be safe from tsunami, the gases will
spread to everywhere. Before the chemical facilities and tanks have been built,
maybe we could safe once we go to the mountain. But, it could not be, after
chemical industries are built.)
On the other hand, in the interview with a head of an RW, the person heard about
the Krakatau eruption from father and grandfather and imagined that many villagers
will be affected if the similar events of the 1883 eruption will be happened. However,
the person did not explicitly connect the big eruption with the complex consequences.
Original discourse: Itu pernah kejadiannya itu memang itu karena memang
orang belum terlalu banyak sehingga korbannya gak banyak juga tapi itupun
mencapai ribuan, tapi kalau sekarang mungkin ratusan ribu. Kalau dulu karena
memang masyarakatnya juga belum ada belum penuh tapi banyak juga yang
korban.
(Translation: It ever happened that it is because people are not too many so
that the victim is not much too but itupun reach thousands, but if now maybe
hundreds of thousands. In the past, because the people have not been full yet,
there are many victims.)
3.1.2. Fires and accidents in factories
Although some discourse in the FGD did not directly relate with the complex disaster
risk, topics on fires and accidents in factories were often raised. For example, a dis-
course demonstrates that once a fire will be happened, it will cause other fires and
the fires can be expanded. Some FGD participants were worried that a gas-pipe line
goes through the village and many chemical facilities. The interview with a head of a
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RW also showed us a past case of a large-scale fire. It is noteworthy that people are
clearly aware of the industrial disaster risk.
Original discourse: Wah diameternya kalo pabrik kimia tuh paling ada yang
Cuma sampe dengan tembok. Sama-sama kimia, misalnya terjadi ledakan
sekelas ini, itu kemungkinan ke sebelah, ke sebelah, ke sebelah lagi.
(Translation: Well, the diameter of the chemical plant can reach to the wall.
Both are chemical. If there is an explosion this level, it is likely to reach next
door, to the next, and to the next.)
Original discourse: Dari Peye sampai Banjarnegara, mungkin puluhan pabrik
kimia. Jalur pipa gas ada. […] Itu yang kita takutkan.
(Translation: From Peye to Banjarnegara, perhaps dozens of chemical plants.
Gas pipeline exists. […] That’s what we’re afraid of.)
3.1.3. Floods
In addition, with the complex disaster risk and the aforementioned industrial disaster
risk, floods were relatively more frequent in Lebak Gede village.
Original discourse: Jadi belum ada, istilahnya sekarang tuh, belum ada wadah
tim relawan, atau misalnya banjir, di sini kan sering banjir, pak.
(Translation: So, there is no, the term is now tuh, there is no container volun-
teer team, or for example flood, here’s often flood, sir.)
3.2. Risk information sharing with Pertamina
It was April 2013 when Pertamina started its operation (LPG tanks) in Lebak Gede
village. However, our survey revealed that socialization activities prior to the tank
construction was not sufficient. Risk information on the complex disaster did not reach
surrounding communities.
Original discourse: Kita nggak tahu itu akan jadi tangki. Kita berpikirnya hanya
untuk, pertama, apa, rumah sakit aja waktu itu
(Translation: We did not know it was going to be a tank. We think it’s just for,
first time, what, a hospital at that time.)
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Original discourse: Minimal, pertemuan itu dilakukan mensosialisasikan
dampak itu dan kesiagaan. Awalnya saya pengen begitu. [...] Tapi sampai
sekarang belum.
(Translation: At aminimum, themeeting was conducted to socialize the impact
and alertness. At first, I wanted to. [...] But until now not yet.)
Also, the FGD demonstrated that some of the villagers are feeling difficulties in
communicating with Pertamina, because all of management staffs of Pertamina are
not necessarily located in their facility in Lebak Gede village (the headquarters office of
Pertamina locates in Jakarta). Furthermore, when Pertamina will conduct maintenance
of their facilities, they have sent announcements or letters to leaders of relevant
neighborhood associations (known as ‘RW (RukunWarga)’ in Indonesia in this context),
and sometimes it actually happened that they did not notify anything at all.
Original discourse: Ketika mereka akan mengadakan perbaikan, mereka
hanya pemberitahuan ke kita, “kepada yang terhormat, pengurus RW 01, 02,
03, sampai 09”. kebanyakan gitu, “bahwa kami akan mengadakan perbaikan,
overhaul, overhaul, oleh karena itu kami mohon maklumnya.
(Translation: When they will conduct maintenance, they just give announce-
ments to us, “to head of RW 01, 02, 03, until RW 09”. Mostly like, “we will
conduct maintenance and overhaul. Therefore, we hope your understanding.”)
In comparison with Pertamina, Indonesia Power (a subsidiary-power plant station of
a state-owned electricity supplier) has already conducted a tsunami drill. Even though
the detailed of the tsunami drill was not explained to the authors, people of Lebak
Gede village is aware of difference with these two companies.
Original discourse: Kalau Indonesia Power sudah melakukan. [...] Terakhir
tsunami drill waktu itu ya, di lapangan bola Kelapa 7.
(Translation: Indonesia Power has done. [...] Last tsunami drill was yes, held
on the soccer ball field Kelapa 7.)
The local forum entity in Lebak Gede village has not collaborated with industries,
including Pertamina. There is an association named ‘Anyar Merak Cilegon Chemical
Manufacturers Association (AMCCMA)’ in Cilegon, which is composed of industries
around Cilegon. However, the local forum entity does not have any experience to work
with the AMCCMA, because the AMCCMA focuses on inter-company relation, and there
is no contact between the forum and the AMCCMA. Therefore, the complex disaster
risk sharing is quite limited.
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3.3. Risk information sharing with the governmental agencies
Risk information on the complex disaster has not yet achieved by the governmental
agencies such as the Cilegon city government and the Banten provincial government.
According to some discourse in the FGD, government-lead volunteer organizations,
such as ‘Destana’ and ‘Siaga Bencana’, have already been organized, and first-aid and
evacuation trainings were conducted. However, the authors do not clearly confirm
if the governmental bodies disseminated the complex disaster risk information to
people.
3.4. Risk information sharing with Indonesian Red Cross
Indonesian Red Cross (known as ‘PMI (Palang Merah Indonesia)’ in Indonesia) imple-
mented activities about flood management in Lebak Gede village from 2012 to 2014,
jointly cooperatingwith the Japan Red Cross. Our survey demonstrates that their activi-
ties were recognized by local people, but the risk information sharing did not happen at
that time. As a part of the Red Cross activities, a lot of evacuation signs were set in the
village, but not all of the villagers do not understand them properly. The hazard maps
were also developed, but they were not disseminated to individual houses, nor shown
to the public. The participation of the villagers was limited to the Red Cross activities,
and it can be reasonable to consider that the complex disaster risk information sharing
did not happen.
Original discourse: Itu kan cuma tanda aja, tapi nggak semua orang paham.
(Translation: It is just a sign, but not all community members know the mean-
ing of the evacuate sign.)
4. Discussion
This article examined the complex disaster preparedness and perception in Lebak Gede
village in Cilegon, in accordancewith themodel for communication of risk by Rodriguez
et al. [10]. Themodel estimates interactions for risk information sharing betweenmany
actors. Our survey revealed that involvement of the Indonesia Power (the industry),
the governmental agencies and the Indonesian Red Cross were vital (see Figure 2).
Contrary, any clear involvement of educational institutions and mass media was not
clearly found during this study. The roles of actors need to be further elaborated.
DOI 10.18502/kls.v4i5.2556 Page 245
ICOHS 2017
Figure 2: Verification of model for the communication of risk (The addition (italic parts) was made by the
authors. The original figure was reprinted from Rodriguez et al. [10]. The authors deleted some arrows
which were not explicitly found during this study.)
The local people has already been aware of the potential threats by large-scale
natural disasters, namely considering the Krakatau volcanic eruption. They can esti-
mate that evacuation behavior might save life, but factories might be destroyed, and
contamination can happen. On the other hand, not all of people can imagine such
a complicated consequence due to the combination of the natural disasters and the
industrial disasters. Also, not only low-frequency-big-disasters, but alsomore frequent
disasters such as industrial accidents and floods were recognized by the local people.
Some preparedness activities were conducted in the village, but they were not orga-
nized in consideration with the complex disasters, and the participation by the local
people was limited. Furthermore, the local people experienced many industrial acci-
dents in the past, but these experiences did not trigger a significantmindset change for
a more organized preparedness. They had more focus on floods as their preparedness
priority. These findings indicate that multiple risks need to be shown in a single map
with an integrated method and raise the importance of understanding on the process
of snow-balling effects and damages.
Themodel of the Rodriguez et al. [10] has an implicit assumption that there is a single
risk and seems to show that the model is static. Communities like Lebak Gede village
face with multiple types of risk. Thus, the model application is required to be further
explored. Also, communities are not stable but dynamic and changed chronologically.
In Lebak Gede village, according to an interviewee (a head of a RW), the number
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of immigrants increased since the late 1990s, and approximately 40 percent of the
villagers are not indigenous. Some villagers are members of the local disaster forum
or staffs of the government-lead volunteer organizations. The composition of the ‘local
people’, which was indicated by Rodriguez et al. [10], needs to be carefully considered
in order to clarify if the local people is homogeneous.
This article adopted the qualitative method for gathering specific information, but
more comprehensive research can contribute to verify preparedness and risk percep-
tion on the complex disasters. Although this article specifically focused on one village
(Lebak Gede village) and its preparedness and perception, the findings will be further
investigated for generalizing community preparedness for the complex disasters.
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